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I. The World Heritage List
The World Heritage List compiled by UNESCO has become highly popular. It has been described as "the most effective international legal instrument for the protection of the cultural and natural heritage" (Strasser, 2002, p. 215) . Many World Heritage Sites are major attractions for cultural tourism and are icons of national identity (Shackley, 2006:85) .
In the 1920s, the League of Nations became aware of the growing threat to the cultural and natural heritage of our planet. However, nothing concrete emerged despite many years of intensive discussions and drafting of reports. In 1959, UNESCO launched a spectacular and successful international campaign to save the Abu Simbel temples in the Nile
Valley. In 1966, UNESCO spearheaded an international campaign to save Venice after disastrous floods threatening the survival of the city. In November 1972, the General
Conference of UNESCO adopted the Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage at its 17th session in Paris (for a review of the creation of the UNESCO, see e.g. Capello, 1970) . The Convention "seeks to encourage the identification, Heritage List "a catastrophic success" (Henley, 2001 As a reaction to this imbalance, in 1994, the World Heritage Committee started the
Global Strategy for a Balanced, Representative and Credible World Heritage List (hereafter
Global Strategy), which intends to raise the share of non-European Sites on the List. Despite this explicit new strategy and intended strong action, "the immediate success of these efforts is questionable" (Strasser 2002, p. 226 ).
This paper analyses whether, and in which respects, there is an "unbalanced"
representation of continents and countries on the World Heritage List. We further address the question of whether the international organization UNESCO is effective in achieving the goal of its own formally ratified resolution. In particular, we test whether the Global Strategy has reached its goal of reducing the inequality of distribution of Sites.
In order to lay the groundwork, Section II briefly discusses the scholarly literature Strategy. If anything, it has increased further (Section V). We discuss policy implications and possibilities to reform the List (Section VI). Section VII concludes.
II. The Background Literature
The central task of the World Heritage Convention -to protect the global public goods of "world cultural and natural heritage" and at the same time to achieve some measure of representatives among continents and countries -links up closely to various topics analyzed in international organizations research. The role of international organizations in the provision of global collective goods or global commons, the respective international cooperation, international regimes and international institutions are examined, for example, by Keohane (1967) , or Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001) . Important work on the dysfunctions in international organizations, is by Grant and Keohane (2005), or MartinezDiaz (2009) . The representatives of countries in the international system and the respective organizations are dealt with, for example by Peterson (2010 ), or Carpenter (2007 in the context of advocacy frameworks and civil society. Political influences in international organizations are the subject of studies by, for example, Oatley and Yackee (2004) or Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009) .
In the broader social science literature on World Heritage and on the UNESCO program certain aspects have received special attention: the process of designation with respect to its formal nature, the stakeholder groups participating and their politics (e.g. Cleere, 2006, Harrison and Hitchcock, 2005) , the consequences of inclusion in the World
Heritage List especially with respect to tourism (e.g. Tunney, 2005, Cochrane and Tapper, 2006) , visitor management (e.g. Fyall, 2006, Shackley, 2006) , as well as case studies of individual Sites (e.g for Stonehenge Mason and Kuo, 2006, or for Angkor Wager, 1995) . The consequences of being listed, in particular, on the number of visitors frequenting these Sites, are studied, for example, in Yang, Lin, and Han (2009) or Tisdell and Wilson (2002) . In economics, only a few works deal with the UNESCO World Heritage, such as the doctoral dissertation by van der Aa (2005) , the book by Santagata, De Caro, and Marrelli (2008) , and the papers by Frey and Santagata (2011) . An excellent analysis of general heritage issues is provided in Peacock and Rizzo (2008) . Other economic analyses mainly evaluate the utility of preserving the past as well as financial consequences (see, for instance Peacock, 1978 , Rizzo, 2006 . Politico-economic aspects of the List are examined by Frey, Pamini, and Steiner (2011) and . The intention of this paper is to provide an international, empirical analysis of the distribution of Sites and the effectiveness of the international institution UNESCO in reaching its stated goals.
Nomination Process
The advisory bodies to the World Heritage Committee used a somewhat ad hoc method to determine the Sites to be initially included on the List. The Convention's criterion of "outstanding value to humanity" is noble but proved to be almost impossible to define
clearly. An important development has been the establishment of 10 criteria for inclusion in claimed, "The scrutiny of these systems by the two Advisory Boards is now rigorous.…" (Cleere, 2006:xxii) .
III. Selection Aspects of the World Heritage List
From the point of view of political economy, it may be argued that the selection of the Sites is questionable because it is subject to rent-seeking by experts and politicians (Buchanan, 1980 , Frey, 1984 , Frey, Pamini and Steiner., 2011 . Politicians in their respective countries and expert representatives on the advisory groups ICOMOS and IUCN strongly influence the selection of what Cultural and Natural Sites should be on the List. In most cases, the Committee follows the experts' recommendations. Technical experts rely on their knowledge as art historians and conservators, but "the concept … has never been the object of a truly operational definition" (Musitelli, 2002 : 329) .
Some scholars go so far as to question the legitimacy of the List. Meskell (2002) argues that the concept of World Heritage is flawed by the fact that it privileges an idea originating in the West, which requires an attitude toward material culture that is distinctly European in origin. Affluent countries seem to have benefited most from the Convention.
According to a Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, the World
Heritage List "was conceived, supported and nurtured by the industrially developed societies, reflecting concern for a type of heritage that was highly valued in those countries" (Olmland, 1997) . Moreover, many countries do not have the necessary conservation infrastructure that allows them to prepare nominations to the List at a sufficiently sustained pace to improve its representativeness (Strasser, 2002, pp. 226-227) . According to the Convention, the state parties must identify and delineate the property (Art. 3); in addition, they must ensure the identification, protection, conservation, presentation, and transmission to future generations (Art. 4). These requirements put a heavy burden on countries wishing to put a site on the List.
In order to avoid a negative decision, state parties often withdraw a nomination if the Committee or its Bureau is likely to decide unfavorably.
Being on the UNESCO List is highly desired by many as it brings prominence and monetary revenue. The attention of donors and for-profit firms are attracted, and there is a positive relationship between the number of World Heritage Sites and the number of tourist arrivals per country (Lazzarotti, 2000, Yang, Lin and Han, 2009) . One may even speak of a "heritage industry" (Johnson and Thomas, 1995) . Indeed, inclusion on the List is considered to be a great honor for the respective nation and accordingly gets much attention by the press, radio, and TV ( Van der Aa, 2005) . It has been highly politicized as many political and bureaucratic representatives of countries consider it a worthwhile goal from which they personally profit. Consequently, the selection is subject to political pressures; thus, it is not determined solely by the 10 official criteria deemed to be "objective. the Committee was a compatriot at that time. In addition, the location within the country where the Committee holds its annual meeting seems to have an impact on the number and kind of nominations. The meeting in 1997 indeed was held in Naples (Cleere, 1998) .
Francesco Bandarin, the Director of the World Heritage Centre, acknowledges, "Inscription has become a political issue. It is about prestige, publicity and economic development" (Henley, 2001) .
IV. Distribution of Sites
The distribution of Sites on the List across continents is highly unequal. Forty-seven percent of the Sites are in Europe. 4 The European predominance is larger for Cultural Sites (54 percent) than for Natural Sites (22 percent). In contrast, (sub-Saharan) Africa has less than 9 percent of all Sites, and the Arabian countries have 7 percent. The Americas and AsiaPacific are better represented with 17 percent and 20 percent, respectively (see Figure 1 ).
FIGURE 1
The distribution of Sites across countries is also highly skewed. It also could be argued that the "balance" should relate to the size of the country as measured by area in square kilometers. The larger a country, the more likely it is to find some Site worth including on the List. This argument seems to be more convincing for Natural than for Cultural Sites. A large country most likely has more different landscapes than a small one, some of which may fit the UNESCO criteria. The distribution of sites per square kilometer is also clearly headed by Europe with 19 sites per million square kilometers, whereas all other continents possess between four and five (see Frey and Pamini, 2010 whereas, all living cultures, especially "traditional cultures," were underrepresented.
To support the Global Strategy in achieving greater balance, UNESCO intended to encourage countries to become state parties to the Convention, to prepare tentative Lists, and to advance the nominations of properties from categories and regions currently not well represented on the World Heritage List. UNESCO intends to raise the share of non-European sites as well as the share of living cultures included on the List.
Inequality Over Time
The UNESCO Strategy intended to lower the imbalance, increase the representativeness, and reduce European dominance. The time has come to evaluate the outcome of the Global Strategy empirically.
A first indicator of the imbalance is the Gini coefficient as a measure of statistical dispersion. As seen in Figure 2 , the year than all of the other continents. Consequently, the share of total Sites belonging to Europe rose even after the introduction of the Global Strategy (see Figure 3) .
FIGURE 3
As argued above, the relevant unit for consideration on the World Heritage List could be the size of the population or area per country. Figure 4 shows the number of total Sites per one million square kilometers for each of the continents. delegate to the Committee suggested establishing a working group on the balance of Cultural and Natural Sites (Strasser, 2002) . One goal of the Global Strategy is to approximate the share of these two types of Heritage Sites. Figure 6 depicts the development of the number of Cultural, Natural, and Mixed Sites. Although the number of Mixed Sites has increased the least, the number of Cultural Sites has increased much faster than the number of Natural Sites. In relative terms, the ratio of Cultural to Natural Sites tends to increase monotonously over time. This reflects an increasing share of Cultural Sites-even after the introduction of the Global Strategy.
FIGURE 6

Simultaneous Analysis of the Impact of the UNESCO Strategy
The next step is to investigate the impact of the Global Strategy on the distribution of Sites by simultaneously controlling for different factors. Here, we focus on two factors explicitly mentioned in the Global Strategy: the European predominance and the impact of the development level of a country on the number of Sites.
First, we perform cross-section regressions to estimate the impact of the continents and GDP per capita (1,000 USD per capita) as a measure for economic development. The dependent variable is the total number of Sites a country had before the Global Strategy (1993) and 14 years later (2007) . Because the number of Sites is a count variable, we use negative binomial regressions to estimate the partial correlations. We control for the factors introduced above: area (one million square kilometers) as a proxy for natural potential and population (100 million persons) as a proxy for cultural production potential. As a technical control variable, we add the number of years that a country has been part of the Convention, limiting its potential to get Sites (tenure). Table 1 Moreover, the Global Strategy intended to increase the share of Sites in less developed regions. Using GDP per capita as a measure for economic development, the estimated coefficients reveal that the Global Strategy also failed with respect to this objective.
Although in 1993, before the introduction of the Global Strategy, the coefficient of GDP per capita was not statistically significantly correlated with the number of Sites, 14 years later the correlation was positive and significant. More developed countries obtained more Sites after the introduction of the Global Strategy. We also estimate the impact of the determinants mentioned above only for the Sites obtained after 1993. The results in Table 1 , column (3), support our previous results.
In a second step, we test for a structural break by using the panel structure of the data and introducing a Strategy dummy taking the value one after 1993. Interaction effects of the Strategy dummy and the determinants reveal whether the slope of these determinants changed after 1993, which would be an indicator for the success of the Global Strategy. Again, we use the total number of Sites of a country up to a certain year as the dependent variable with panel data structure and random effects. 8 In the basic setting without interaction effects, the results from the cross-section estimations hold (see Table 2 , column (4)).
TABLE 2
In Table 2 , column (5) A somewhat different approach is to use the new Sites per year a country gets as a dependent variable. These estimations of the flow of Sites confirm our previous results (see Table 2 , column (6)). The only difference is the negative coefficient of tenure. Countries that have been members for a longer time obtain fewer Sites per year. However, in this specification, the only significant interaction-term coefficient is the one of the Global Strategy and tenure (see Table 2 , column (7)). This coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that after the introduction of the Global Strategy the more tenured countries obtained relatively more Sites than countries with lower tenure. This is contradictory to the aim of UNESCO to support countries that recently joined the Convention.
Overall, our results indicate that the Global Strategy did not help to increase the balance and representativeness of the List with respect to continents and development. If anything, the distribution of Sites has become even more biased, considering the objectives set by UNESCO.
VI. Alternatives to Protect Heritage
Reforming the List
Some of the shortcomings of the List have been noticed by the Convention and proposals for reform have been discussed. One shortcoming is the unbalanced distribution of Sites, which was the aim of the Global Strategy, as discussed above. UNESCO intends to increase the representativeness of the List but struggles to find appropriate criteria (e.g., chronological periods, cultural criteria, or regional distribution). However, underrepresented state parties are encouraged to apply to change the composition of the List. Considering the imbalance of the List, UNESCO has developed a priority system, which prefers state parties with no sites. Moreover, the number of sites per country and year is limited to one in an effort to decrease the imbalance (Strasser, 2002) . However, these measures have not had a significant effect so far. In addition, van der Aa (2005) proposes opening the nomination process: Every country, organization, or individual should be allowed to nominate sites.
Many more sites would be nominated, so the selection process within a country would probably be less biased. However, the evaluation by the Committee would have to be much stricter.
A second major shortcoming is that the number of Sites on the UNESCO List has continuously grown over time. The Convention does not set a numerical limit for the List, and this overextension of the List imposes problems whereby the Committee has to monitor the state of conservation and management of the Sites (Benhamou, 1996) . Imposing a time restriction or making a reevaluation after a certain time obligatory would mitigate this problem because it simplifies the delisting of Sites. This "sunset clause" is successfully Another suggestion for reform is to introduce an overall maximum number of Sites.
By doing so, the problem of overextension is solved. Monitoring the Sites would be facilitated significantly. Sites would be listed according to their quality but also according to their state of maintenance. Compared to the actual situation, a competition for the best protection would arise in order to be listed .
Alternative Protection Measures
A third major shortcoming is the influence of politicians and bureaucrats on the List and the induced distortions by rent-seeking (Frey, Pamini and Steiner, 2011) . As a result, the List reflects national instead of global interests (Ashworth and van der Aa, 2006 it. In the absence of external effects, the market could be trusted to preserve the globe's cultural and natural heritage. Few economists, not to speak of other people, would be prepared to argue that this is the case. Indeed, the global heritage is characterized by strong positive external effects so that markets do not, or insufficiently, function (Peacock and Rizzo, 2008, Towse, 2010) . A second possibility of using the market to preserve efficiently the public good of the World Heritage is to introduce World Culture Certificates. At present, some (rich) countries spend a lot of money on the preservation of cultural monuments that are of only secondary importance. At the same time, due to a lack of money in other (poor) countries highly valuable cultural monuments fall into ruins. With regard to the preservation of humankind's cultural goods, this is a waste of resources. The World Culture Certificate scheme would induce nations to spend the money where it produces the greatest effect on preserving world heritage (see Frey and Pamini, 2009 .
VII. Conclusions
The effort of UNESCO through the World Heritage Commission to establish a World
Heritage List containing the most treasured Sites of humanity's culture and landscapes constitutes a great step forward towards preserving one of the most important global public goods on our planet. The List now contains more than 900 Sites, and its number has been steadily increasing since its establishment almost 40 years ago. The last four criteria concern Natural Sites: 1) to contain superlative natural phenomena or areas of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance 2) to be outstanding examples representing major stages of earth's history, including the record of life, significant on-going geological processes in the development of landforms, or significant geomorphic or physiographic features 3) to be outstanding examples representing significant on-going ecological and biological processes in the evolution and development of terrestrial, fresh water, coastal and marine ecosystems and communities of plants and animals 4) to contain the most important and significant natural habitats for in-situ conservation of biological diversity, including those containing threatened species of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation Zur Anzeige wird der QuickTime™ Dekompressor "" benötigt. 
